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Purchasing Power Parity and Reserve Bank Intervention in the 
Foreign Exchange Market 
Goran Unkovski 
This paper tests the behaviour of the PPP relationship in South Ajdca bel11'een 1993 and 
2003 using cointegration techniques. The period under review is divided into two sub-
phases. The first, from January 1993 to May 1998, encompasses the changing political 
situation and the initial effects of global integration for South Africa. It is found that the 
PPP relationship holds during this time frame. The second phase, between June 1998 
and Decelnber 2003, starts with the severe depreciation of the rand during the Asian 
contagion and encompasses the change of the operational regime at the SARB and the 
2001 randfreefal!. The findings of the study point to the failure of the PPP hypothesis 
during this latter period. A further objective of the study is to discuss the d(ffering 
approaches of the Reserve Bank to the 1998 and the 2001 rand crashes. It is during the 
1998 crash that the repercussions of Reserve Bank intervention in the foreign exchange 
market are most clearly seen. The paper examines the effect of this intervention in light of 
the PPP hvpothesis, and compares it to the non-interventionist stance of the Bank during 













Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a theory of exchange rate determination. In its simplest 
form, it states that the exchange rate change between two currencies over any period of 
time is determined by the change in the two countries' relative price levels (Dornbusch, 
1985). In other words, in the absence of government intervention (trade barriers), an 
internationally traded basket of similar goods should sell for an approximately equal 
effective price \vhen converted into the same currency. If PPP holds, it implies that 
inflation differentials between South Africa and her major trading partners are offset by 
exchange rate changes which therefore keeps the real exchange rate constant (Barr and 
Kahn, 1995). 
The validity of PPP (or whether or not the real exchange rate remains constant) has 
important implications for the competitiveness and prosperity of South African industry. 
For example, an appreciating real exchange rate renders exports less competitive and 
leads to cheaper imports. Sustained appreciation of the real exchange rate could therefore 
have serious negative consequences on the tradeable goods sectors. If deviations from 
PPP are highly variable, this variability of the real exchange rate will increase the 
uncertainty facing manufacturing exporters about the future profitability of their exports 
(Barr and Kahn, 1995). 
More generally, highly variable deviations from PPP are an indication of the risk 
associated with an economy. The more fragile the economy, and the lower the investor 
confidence, the more severe will the capital outflows be during times of uncertainty 
surrounding global and domestic events, and the more variable the exchange rate. Thus, 
the robustness of an economy is exemplified by the behaviour of the exchange rate - the 
closer the exchange rate to its long-run PPP trend, the more robust the economy. 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the empirical validity of PPP in South 
Africa between 1993 and 2003 using a cointegration approach. More specifically, the 











relationship. The period under review is divided into two sub-phases. The first, from 
January 1993 to May 1998, encompasses the changing political situation and the initial 
effects of global integration for South A frica. It is found that the PPP relationship holds 
during this time frame. The second phase, between June 1998 and December 2003, starts 
with the severe depreciation of the rand during the Asian contagion and encompasses the 
change of the operational regime at the SARB and the 2001 rand freefal\. The findings of 
the study point to the failure of the PPP hypothesis during this latter period. 
The secondary objective of the study is to discuss the differing approaches of the Reserve 
Bank to the 1998 and the 200 I rand crashes. It is during the 1998 crash that the 
repercussions of Reserve Bank intervention in the foreign exchange (FX) market are most 
clearly seen. The paper examines the effect of this intervention in light of the PPP 
hypothesis, and compares it to the non-interventionist stance of the Bank during the 2001 
deprec iati on. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section provides a 
brief literature review on research into the PPP hypothesis. Section 3 list events in the 
South African foreign exchange market between 1979 and 2003, and section 4 discusses 
the risk associated with the South African economy. Section 5 provides theoretical 
background on the methodology used to test the PPP relationship. Section 6 describes the 
data used in the PPP tests. Section 7 discusses the estimation procedure and the results 
obtained, section 8 analyses the PPP results with reference to Reserve Bank intervention, 
and section 9 discusses the recent commodity price boom and its implications for future 











2. Empirical Background 
Although straightforward in theory, real world factors such as trade barriers, 
differentiated products, tastes, and costly information, complicate the concept of PPP. 
Therefore, in testing the validity of PPP, results from economic literature have been 
mixed. There has been little (if any) support for the theory in the short-run while the 
results on PPP in the long-run have been more varied. Results in support of the existence 
of PPP have predominantly been conducted during hyperinflationary periods and in the 
presence of transaction costs [Frenkel (1980), Hakkio (1984), Davyutan and Pippenger 
(1985), Taylor (1988), McNown and Wallace (1989), Phylaktis (1992), Dockery and 
Georgellis (1994), and Geppert (1997)]. 
More recently, results of tests using cointegration techniques have been more favourable 
to the notion that PPP holds as a long-run equilibrium relationship. For example, Ramirez 
and Khan (1999) have found supportive evidence for PPP in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Japan. Canada, and France such results differ substantially from other time 
series studies which found evidence against long-run PPP [Krugman (1978), Dornbusch 
(1980), and Frenkel (1981 a, 1981 b)]. 
Issues related to whether PPP holds in South Africa have been examined in various 
papers. Tsikata (1998) and Subramanian (1998) show that the effective nominal 
depreciation of the rand during the 1990s is almost fully reflected in higher prices of 
imported goods, although an important caveat is that results are extremely sensitive to the 
choice of price aggregates and sample period. A study by Aron, Elbadawi, and Kahn 
(1997), states that the real exchange rate in South Africa during 1970-1995 is 
nonstationary, implying the breakdown of strict PPP. The same study shows, however, 
that real exchange rate fluctuations can be explained by variations in a set of economic 
"fundamentals" such as trade liberalisation, terms of trade, government expenditures, 
capital flows, and official reserves. This is to some degree consistent with the findings of 











real shocks but appears to hold constant in periods where there are relatively few shocks 
and where monetary and exchange rate policies are more consistent. 
Until the mid-l 980s, econometric analyses to determine the validity of the PPP theory 
were carried out using the ordinary and generalised least squares methods (Isard, 1995). 
However, results based on these methods are not reliable because they fail to incorporate 
the fact that the data used are nonstationary. According to Granger and Newbold (1974), 
regressions involving nonstationary variables using the classical methods are spurious. 
Variables need to be appropriately differenced to render them stationary. But Hendry and 
Mizon (1978), amongst others, have shown that differencing removes the ability to infer 
long-run steady state relationships between variables. Engle and Granger's (1987) 











3. Historical Overview 
3.1 The Validity ofPPP during the 1979-1992 period 
Barr and Kahn (1995) tested the behaviour of the PPP relationship in South Africa 
between ] 979 and 1992 using co integration techniques. They divided the dataset into 
three sub-periods, to take account of the various shocks to the economy and the changes 
in the policy regime. 
Their results pointed out that the PPP in South Africa broke dovm between 1979 and 
1988. This breakdown was expected, considering that the period was characterised by 
variability of the gold price, severe political shocks and the debt crisis. Changes in the 
Reserve Bank's exchange rate and monetary policy were also notable over this period. 
Barr and Kahn found that the PPP held between 1988 and 1992. The real exchange rate 
was stable, and there were relatively few real shocks and the macroeconomic policies 
were far more consistent and stable. 
It follows from the Barr and Kahn study that PPP breaks down during periods of real 
shocks but appears to hold in periods where there are relatively few shocks and where 











3.2 Description of South African Exchange Rate Movements 
Januarv 1993 December 2003 
Prior to 1992, the South African economy was not sufficiently open for the exchange rate 
to playa significant role in monetary policy (De Wet, 2002). The economy was insulated 
from external events by the sanctions imposed during the latter half of the 1980s. But 
political uncertainty after 1992 began to put increased pressure on the exchange rate. 
From January 1993 to mid-1994, the nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by 
approximately 18%, and as this exceeded the inflation differential between South Africa 
and her major trading partners, it implied a real effective depreciation of about 10% over 
the period, thus countering the real appreciation from 1988 (Aron, Elbadawi and Kahn, 
1997, pA). 
Liberalisation efforts were intensified following the general elections in 1994. and the 
financial rand mechanism was terminated in March 1995 and the exchange rate unified. 
Capital controls on residents were slowly relaxed while virtually all controls on non-
residents were removed. Since the unification, there has been greater variability of the 
real and nominal exchange rates. This variability was further reinforced by the fact that 
South Africa was only just re-entering the global economic arena. South Africa was 
especially vulnerable, as a newly emerging market, to the foreign investment flows into 
and out ofthe country. These flows were subject to both global and domestic events (De 
Wet, 2003). 
The general stability that had prevailed in the market for foreign exchange in South 
Africa during 1995 and the first six weeks of 1996 came to an abrupt end in the middle of 
February. The exchange rates of the rand decreased sharply against all major currencies. 
Between February and August, the nominal effective exchange rate lost 19.5% (Quarterly 
Bulletin. 1996). This was due to rumours that the South African economy was struggling 
with global integration, and that her trading partners were benefiting from increased 
capital flows on the back of the 1990's stock-market boom. This led to fears that the rand 











exchange rate was brought about by the deficit on the current account of the balance of 
payments that was not fully matched by a net inflow of capital from abroad. Between the 
end of 1995 and the end of 1996, the overall decline of the nominal effective exchange 
rate was 21.9%. 
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This period was followed by the strengthening of the rand in the first quarter of 1997, as 
sentiment in the market responded to the improvement in the foreign trade balance and a 
retarding money and credit growth in the final quarter of 1996. The nominal effective 
exchange rate gained 10.9% between November 1996 and March 1997, and the real 
effective exchange rate increased by approximately 9.5% over the same period (Quarterly 
Bulletin. 1997a, 1997b). 
During the rest of 1997, the nominal effective exchange rate gradually declined, while the 
developments in the international exchange markets were profoundly influenced by 
events in a number of Southeast Asian economies. The recessionary conditions in Asia 
(especially as Japan - the largest economy in the region moved into recession), and the 
financial crisis in Russia during the second quarter of 1998, facilitated a general move to 
quality. International investors moved their funds out of emerging markets into the US 
(especially US Treasury bonds) and Europe (Schaling and Schoeman, 1999). 
The severe effects of the subsequent rand depreciation began to unfold in May 1998 with 
massive outflows from the bond market. A mismatch behveen the rates in the money 
market and the rates in the forward market opened up an arbitrage gap. What ensued can 
best be described as a battle between the Reserve Bank and speculators, as the Reserve 
Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market by using reserves to buy forward 
contracts guaranteeing the rand's exchange rate against the dollar. With the use of the 
forward book, the net open forward position (NOFP) increased to USD 23 billion. 
Figuratively speaking, the Reserve Bank left the battle bloodied and defeated. Chris Stals, 
then Governor of the Reserve Bank, generated a huge NOFP in the forvvard market 
(effectively a liability for South Africa), and the rand nonetheless depreciated drastically. 
Between May and August 1998, the nominal effective exchange rate fell by 19% while 











Figure 2: Nominal Effective Ex("hange Rate amI Relative Prices (1995=100) 
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In September 1998, the IMF publicly rebuked the Reserve Bank's handling of the crisis. 
The IMF pointed out that, like other emerging markets, South Africa merely faced a 
contagion problem from Asia. That is, the herd mentality of investors towards quality 
was a short-run phenomenon, and would have dissipated on its own. Had the Reserve 
Bank been less interventionist in the FX market, and less hesitant to raise the repo rate 











reasserted themselves once the storm blew over (as had happened following the 1995 
investor scare). Instead the Bank had unnecessarily created a South African financial 
crisis all of its own. 
The consequences for the real economy were harsh. By first usmg FX intervention, 
instead of increasing the repo (which at that stage in the contagion, according to Schaling 
and Schoeman, would have been quite effective), the Reserve Bank pushed (perceived) 
fundamentals down. This created an unstable currency which rendered interest rate policy 
increasingly ineffective. According to Schaling and Schoeman, the macroeconomic 
outcome was the worst of all possible worlds. An unstable currency, high inflation, and 
the persistently high level of interest rates pushed the economy into recession by the end 
of 1998. 
Whereas in 1998 the Reserve Bank intervened in the FX market by using the forward 
book, the Bank started changing its position under the new leadership of Tito Mboweni I. 
A new monetary policy inflation targeting - was introduced on 6 April 2000. Under this 
policy, the emphasis was given to domestic price stabiliti. That is, the Reserve Bank 
wanted to support balanced and sustainable economic groVv1h through lower inflation 
levels. This was seen as a move away from direct intervention in the FX market. 
During 1999, the currency recovered somewhat and its real effective rate actually 
increased during the first six months of 1999 by more than 5%. However, owing to high 
interest rates, and widespread insolvencies and liquidations in the private sector (a legacy 
of the 1998 FX intervention), the rand began a long slide at the turn of the new 
millennium. Over the period from the beginning of 2000 to mid-200 1, the nominal 
effective exchange rate maintained an almost consistent and fairly well-defined declining 
trend. 
J In August 1999, Tito Mboweni took over as the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank. 
2 The monetary and exchange rate policy has been more focused on balance of payments and inflation 











Furthermore, the Reserve Bank and the National Treasury had been in the process of 
actively reducing the NOFP by "buying foreign exchange". By the end of the first quarter 
of 2001 the NOFP had been reduced from $23 billion in 1998 to $9.4 billion. Although 
the policy of reducing the NOFP was praised by the IMF, the rating agencies, and the 
investment banking community, South A frican experts from the private sector agreed that 
the Reserve Bank's commitment to reduce the NOFP by buying US dollars contributed 
significantly to the perception that the rand was a one-way bet. 
After a steady decline earlier in 2001, the rand surprised everyone by appearing to be in 
freefall in December. The nominal effective exchange rate had lost 32% year-on-year 
(December 2001-2002), and 16% within the month of December. The real effective 
exchange rate had lost 25% year-on-year, and 15% within December. The unexpected 
depreciation in the final months of 2001 led to widespread public concern and confusion 
among policymakers. 
Many experts and analysts would describe the overall macro-economic position in South 
Africa during the first three quarters of 2001 as being characterised by "sound 
fundamentals". That is, the rapid rand depreciation happened in spite of falling inflation, 
a manageable current account deficit, disciplined monetary and fiscal policies, and a 
growing economy in the face of a global slowdown. 
The sentiment surrounding South Africa during most of 2001 (prior to the rand freefall) 
could be personified partially by Moody's upgrading the investment grade sovereign risk 
ratings afforded to the country in November 2001. With reference to the FX market, this 
sovereign risk rating upgrade was tantamount to stating that the exchange rate was 
regaining stability. This indicates just how unexpected the freefall in December 2001 
really was. 
As a result of the concern and confusion surrounding the events of the freefall, the 
President of South Africa set up the Commission of Enquiry to investigate the rapid 











The Commission's final report (2002) concluded that several macroeconomic factors 
contributed to the rand depreciation. 
The Commission analysed the circumstances surrounding specific transactions and 
whether the rand's depreciation was due to speculative behaviour. Speculative behaviour 
is necessary for the effectiveness of the price mechanism, but in thin (less liquid) 
markets, such behaviour can have an exaggerated impact, even with very small 
transactions. The Commission predominantly focused on the Wakeford Allegations3, 
which involved allegations about specific share transactions that could have triggered the 
2001 rand free fall , but concluded that the information submitted was either inaccurate or 
inconclusive. Although these and other transactions most probably contributed to the 
rapid depreciation, the Commission did not find any illegal behaviour by market 
participants, and could not deem such transactions as openly unethical. 
The Commission furthermore considered the slowdown in global economic activity 
(dominated by the events following II September attack on New York) and contagion 
effects (mainly from Argentina and Zimbabwe), but concluded that these factors alone 
could not explain the depreciation. However, the Commission hypothesised that these 
factors generated a pervasive negative sentiment and when this was coupled with the 
issues surrounding the FX market, i.e.: the discrepancy between a current account deficit 
and net outflow of foreign investment capital, the thinner FX market after mid-October 
2001 4, and the Reserve Bank's policy of non-intervention - panic set in and "herd 
mentality" prevailed. Although there was no evidence of collusion or acting in concert, 
the rand depreciation became a self-fulfilling prophecy and the impact was grave. This 
was a conclusion reached by a number of experts5. What remains puzzling, however, is 
that the sharp depreciation only materialised in the final months of the year and yet there 
Possible dubious share placement transactions between Deutsche Bank AJ on the one hand, and Saso!, 
Nampak, ~1-Cell, and Billiton on the other 
4 Following 14 October Reserve Bank's announcement that foreign exchange control rulings were to be 
policed more rigorously 
5 Taken from the experts' conclusions given to the Commission of Enquiry; the experts included: Mr 
Gouws, Dr Stals, Dr Abedian, Mr Bruce-Brand, ~1r Mboweni, Ms Ramos, Dr O'NeilL and the Standard 











was no singular, equally abrupt, factor that could be stated as a definite decisive trigger 
for the rand freefal!. 
De Wet (2003) proposes that factors such as historically low interest rates and high 
money supply could have contributed towards the sharp depreciation in the currency, 
stating that this especially applies in the light of a stable international economic 
environment at the time. 
Bhundia and Gottschalk (2003) use a historical decomposition analysis to argue that 
nominal disturbances explain most of the fluctuation in the rand in the latter half of 200 1 
and first quarter of 2002. This is not to say that real disturbances did not contribute or 
have an effect, but rather that they were not a sufficient condition for the sharp 
depreciation at year-end 2001. This is consistent with the Commission's findings. 
Bhundia and Gottschalk found that financial market developments were the most likely 
source of the depreciation, but their deduction is, like the Commission's, inconclusive. 
In his conclusion, stated to the Commission, Dr Abedian6 gave three possible trigger 
scenarios for the rand's December depreciation: 
a. A perfectly legitimate large transaction by one of the major market players might 
have Jed to the emergence of a herd mentality resulting in the run on the rand. 
b. It is technically possible that one may execute a deal fully aware of the full-scale 
domino effects and one does so in order to benefit via a major deal already in 
contract. Such a situation was particularly more feasible when the pure 
speculators were driven out of the market by November 200l. 
c. There were uncoordinated numerous market transactions that culminated in a self-
fulfilling prophecy leading to a severe overshooting in valuation of the currency. 
Deals of this kind might well have had no motive other than well-considered 
business logic, yet the impact or outcome \vas identical to either of scenarios a 
and b. (Commission of Enquiry, 2002) 











Whatever the causes of the rand's depreciation in 2001, the reversal in the rand's fortunes 
since around the second quarter of 2002 has been equally remarkable. During 2002, the 
nominal effective exchange rate appreciated by 17%, followed by a further 22% 
appreciation during 2003. The real effective exchange rate appreciated by 25% in 2002, 
and 19% in 2003. 
Although the Reserve Bank was widely criticised at the time for its non-interventionist 
stance in 200 1, it seems that the policy of reducing the NOFP over the course of 2000-
onwards, paid off. It is probable that the Reserve Bank contributed to the depreciation of 
the rand in the short-run, but non-intervention seems to have been instrumental in the 
rapid recovery of the rand. Mboweni himself stated to the Commission of Enquiry: 
"Given the losses on the forward book and negative perceptions from market participants 
and commentators on the one hand, and the potential impact on the currency of reducing 
the forward book on the other, the Bank had a difficult choice to make. In the long-term 
interest of South Africa, it was decided to place emphasis on reducing the NOFP." 











4. Investment Risk of the South African Economy 
The 1990s saw the opening up of the South African economy and more freedom for 
capital flows into and out of the country. Economic theory stresses many benefits arising 
from free capital flows, but the complications associated with such freedom are given, in 
particular, by the evidence from emerging markets. The events in Mexico (1994), 
Thailand (1997), and Malaysia (1997), are clear examples of the excessive foreign 
exchange volatility that can arise from free international capital flows (Abedian and 
Biggs, 1998). South Africa herself is a perfect example of the correlation between freer 
capital flows and more volatile exchange rate movement. 
The analysis given in the previous section indicates just how volatile the exchange rate 
has been to different forms of domestic or international risk. However, the recovery of 
the exchange rate over the past two years seems to indicate that the economy is much 
more robust. 
It could be argued that the effect of unanticipated news or events on asset prices is a 
possible indication of the risk associated with an economy. A promising measure for the 
risk associated with the South African economy, therefore, could be given by 
international credit ratings. An international credit rating is an opinion by a rating agency 
of the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of a bond issuer or other obligor to 
make full and timely payments due to investors. In other words, this rating indicates the 
"default (risk) premium". The default premium reflects the financial health (solvency) of 
the borrower under consideration and compensates for the risk that he/she "defaults", i.e., 
is unable (or unwilling, in the case of a government) to service his/her debt. Moreover, if 
the borrower in question is the government itself, the default risk premium, or the country 











One would therefore expect that when a measure of "sovereign risk" is optimistic, this 
will reflect sentiment that an economy (characterised by its government) is robust and 
thus the FX market and the exchange rate are less susceptible to news and events that 
generate negative sentiment. 
Table 1 (Grandes and Peter, 2004) below shows the history of credit ratings for South 
Africa, by two main USA-based rating agencies, Moody's Investor Service, and Standard 
& Poor's. These ratings are a measure of "sovereign risk" and are graded relative to other 
countries' risk profiles. 
Table 1: History of CrE'dit Ratings for South Aflira (lmtil I\Iay 31.2003) 
.. --.. 
Daft' Stmulanl & Poor's DatE' I\Ioody's 
• Local Currency ~"'Cumm'Y pomestic Currency Foreign Currency Cre dit Rating edit Rating EondRating EondRating 
Long T e!In I Dullo ok Long Term I Dullo ok 
! 
Feb 26, 2003 May 7, 2003 A! stable BBE! stable A2! stable Baa2 / positive 
i 
NoV' 12, 2002 A- / positiV'e BBB-I positive Nov 29, 2001 A2 / stable B aa2 / stable 
I Oct 12, 2001 Baal 1 rev. for up Baa3 ! rev. for up 
! 
BBB- { stable Feb 7, 2000 Baal I positive Baa3 ! positive 
! 
Feb 25, 2000 A-I stable 
Oct2,1998 Baal! stable B aa3 I stable 
Mar 6, 1998 BBB+ { stable BB+I stable Ju117, 1998 Baal! rev. for 
Baa3 {rev. for 
down down 
Mar7,1997 Baal! negative B . i aa3 ! ne gauve : 
I Nov 20,1995 BBB+ I positiYe BB+ I positiye NoV'20,1995 Baal --------~ 
I 












The foreign currency rating columns in the above table show the perceived riskiness of 
South Africa's FX market on the given date. Relative to the October 1994 ratings, the 
most recent ratings of both agencies are considerably more positive. Moody's rates the 
foreign currency bonds as Baa2 I positive, indicating a medium grade obligation, i.e. 
bonds that are neither highly protected nor poorly secured. Such bonds lack outstanding 
investment characteristics and in fact have speculative characteristics as well. Standard & 
Poor's rates the foreign currency credit as BBB I stable, indicating adequate capacity to 
meet financial commitments but with the threat that adverse economic conditions or 
changing circumstances could weaken such capacity by the obligator. 
The general movement of the ratings between 1994 and 2003 has been in an upward 
direction, indicating a more robust economy and optimism for future stability of the 
exchange rate. Following the 2001 depreciation, Moody's upgraded the foreign currency 
bond rating outlook from stable to positive in February 2003. The positive outlook 
indicates that a rating may be raised. Between 2002 and 2003, Standard & Poor's 
increased the foreign currency rating from BBB minus to BBB only. 
The agencies (Guest, 2003) stated the following reasons as positive factors behind their 
upgrading rationale: 
• Consistent record of sound economic policies and ongoing reform 
implementation, in spite of external shocks 
• Tax reforms have permitted greater fiscal flexibility, allowing tax cuts and 
infrastructural investment 
• Gradual removal of exchange controls and elimination of the Reserve Bank's net 
open fonvard position 
• Dedication to reducing inflation 











On the other hand, factors that could act as long-tenn rating constraints are: 
• External liquidity is relatively modest and reserves cover only 70% of gross 
financing needs 
• Low domestic savings and investment levels 
• Labour market rigidities 
• Social challenges, such as crime, HIV/Aids and unemployment 
The upgrades provide cautious optimism concerning the robustness of the South African 
economy but nonetheless, the ratings given to South Africa' s foreign currency obligations 
are medium grade and possible future runs on the currency cannot be ruled out. The 
recovery of the exchange rate over the past two years is nonetheless indicative of lower 











5. Theoretical Background 
5.1 Statistical Testing ofPPP 
The absolute version of PPP defines the "law of one price" in an integrated, competitive 
market. Abstracting from all and any frictions, the price of a given good will be equal in 
all locations \vhen quoted in the same currency: 
pd S * pf • where 
tIl ~ 
~d is the domestic price level at time t, ~f is the foreign price level at time t, and SI is the 
exchange rate at time t expressed in local currency units per foreign currency unit. 
The absolute version of PPP cannot be interpreted as an empirical condition. Since there 
is no clear notion as to when the PPP relationship actually holds, one cannot assess what 
constitutes deviations from such a relationship. The PPP relationship is thus tested most 
generally over a particular period in an incremental sense (relative PPP) by considering 
deviations over a period of time. The simplest regression form is: 
, where 
V denotes the difference operator, In is the natural log, and e
l 
is a random process with 
constant mean and variance. The estimate of f3 can then be tested for significant 
deviation from 1.0 using standard regression tests, after checking that the standard 
regression assumptions have been satisfied. 7 
The relative PPP is tested using differenced data (as opposed to data in levels) to avoid 
the "spurious regression" results one gets when time-series data is non-stationary. In a 
famous paper Granger and Newbold (1974) introduced the notion of a spurious 
regression. They warned that researchers had ignored the significance of very high serial 
S * pf 
7 Alternatively test the real exchange rate ( I d I ) for stationarity. If the real exchange rate is stationary 
~ 











correlation among the residuals in conventional regression models. They said that 
macroeconomic data was in general non-stationary (or integrated) and that in regressions 
involving levels of variables, the significance tests were usually misleading. The 
conventional t and F tests would tend to reject the hypothesis of no relationship even if 
there was, in fact, none. 
In a Monte-Carlo study, Granger and Newbold (1974)8 created two non-stationary 
random walks x and y that were uncorrelated with each other. They regressed y on x and 
found that in 75% of cases, the t-test on the beta coefficient rejected the null that the 
coefficient was zero. So in 75% of the cases, a spurious significant relationship was 
found. Granger and Newbold concluded that when regressions of this sort were 
performed: 
• The R2 tended to be high 
• Low OW statistics were observed 
• The t=tests were very misleading 
Although it has become standard econometric practice to ensure that the time-series data 
is appropriately differenced before inter-relationships can be meaningfully measured, 
there has been criticism in the literature that it is impossible to infer long-run steady state 
solutions from variables in differenced form (Hendry and Mizon (1978), Davidson et al. 
(1978». Subsequently, Granger and Weiss (1983) argued that a vector of non-stationary 
variables may have linear combinations which are stationary. Engle and Granger (1987) 
formalised these ideas by introducing the notion of cointegration a particular statistical 
interpretation of long-run equilibrium between non-stationary variables which abstracts 
from short-run deviations. 











5.2 The Cointegration Approach 
A series is said to be integrated of order d, denoted l(d), if it contains d unit roots. Such a 
series must be differenced d times to render it stationary. If we consider two series YI and 
XI> which are both /(d), then any linear combination of the two will also be l(d) (e.g., the 
disturbance term from regressing YI on XI)' It is possible, however, that a vector P exists, 
such that the disturbance term from the regression e, == Y/ - f3x
f 
is of lower order of 
integration, l(d-b). Then Engle and Granger (1987) define YI and Xl as co integrated of 
order (d.b). Thus, ifYI and Xl were both 1(1), and e{ ~ 1(0), then the two series would be 
cointegrated of order Cl(1,l). 
The economic explanation of cointegration is that if two (or more) series are linked to 
form an equilibrium relationship spanning the long-run, then even though the series 
themselves may contain stochastic trends (Le., be non-stationary), they will nevertheless 
move closely together over time and the difference between them will be stable (i.e., 
stationary) (Harris, 1995). 
In the context of this paper, the stable (constant) difference referred to in the above 
paragraph can be represented by the real effective exchange rate in the PPP hypothesis. 
That is, if the weighted relative price index variable representing inflation differentials is 
cointegrated with the nominal effective exchange rate variable representing exchange rate 
changes, then PPP will hold since the two series will move closely together over time, 
thus implying that the difference between them (i.e., the real effective exchange rate) will 











Since the link between identification of cointegration and equilibrium can be made, it 
follows that long-run insight can be gained from regressions involving non-stationary 
variables. It must be stressed, however, that the definition of cointegration is a necessary 
condition for applying cointegration analysis to a particular problem, but it is not 
sufficient. In many cases, this technique is used where a coherent argument cannot be 
made that Yt and XI are in a long-run relationship. For cointegration to be used, it is 
necessary to fulfil the requirement of sound theoretic reasoning for cointegrating the 
series in question. Statistical analysis without grounded economic interpretation is bound 
to be of limited (if any) use. The theory of PPP is well established and the use of 











5.3 Unit Root Tests 
In order to test for the possibility of Yt and X t being co integrated, it must be established 
that YI and XI have the same order of integration. 
A possible testing strategy for unit roots is proposed: 
1. Graph the series. Is it trending (exhibit gro\\:th)? What does economic theory tell us? 
2. If the series is not trending, include an intercept in the model for testing a unit root. 
3. If the series is trending, include an intercept and a trend. 
4. Alternatively, use the intercept and a trend model as a "highly powerful" statistical 
model at 5% level, and the intercept-only model as a "moderately powerful" 
statistical model at 5% level. 
5. Decide on how many augmentation terms to include, either via significance ofthe lag 
terms or via an automatic lag selection criterion. 
6. Carry out the test. Reject the null hypothesis if the t value is a sufficiently large 
negative value or the p-value is less than the significance level. Conclude the process 
is stationary (or trend stationary); there is no unit root. 
7. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, perform the test again, with the series expressed 
in first differences (include an intercept only if both an intercept and trend were 
included \vhen testing the levels, otherwise include neither). Rejection of the null 
hypothesis suggests that the process is 1(1). The series has a unit root but is stationary 
after differencing once. [If the first differences exhibit a unit root, carry out the test 
with the series expressed in second differences. In almost all cases the second 











The most general test for the existence of a unit root is taken to be Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). In terms of first differences we may write: 
1"-1 
V'Yt lfIYt-1 + L lJI, V'y,_, + J1 + yt + Et 
,~l 
where lJI (p J), and the level series YI will have a unit root if p = 1 or lJI = 0 . 
'rhe ADF test in the Eviews software package provides an ADF statistic as well as critical 
values for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The statistic relates to the null hypothesis of unit 
root, Ho; lJI = O. Ho can be rejected when the absolute value of the ADF statistic is 
greater than the absolute value of the 1 %, 5%, or 10% critical level. 
In the case \vhere IADF statisticl < Icritical value, it would lead the acceptance of the null 
of a unit root. 
However, accepting the null of unit root does not automatically imply that the first 
difference of YI will be stationary. The ADF test must be applied on the difference of YI 
and the null of unit root rejected to conclude that the level series is in fact 1(1). In this 
case the ADF test takes the form: 
1"-2 
V'2Yt lJIV'Yt_1 + LlJI,V'2yt_, + J1 +Et 
I~l 
where the null hypothesis is Ho : lJI = 0 (unit root). If Ho can be rejected using the critical 
values, it can be concluded that the first difference series is stationary 1(0) and therefore 











6. Data Description 
The data required to test PPP were obtained from the online South African Reserve Bank 
database9• Two time series variables were used for this purpose: the nominal effective 
exchange rate of the rand consistently excluding Zimbabwe (NOM), and the real 
effective exchange rate of the rand consistently excluding Zimbabwe (REAL). Both 
NOM and REAL are defined as the foreign currency price of a unit of local currency 
(rand). The data is in a monthly format, with the index 1995=100, and spans from 
January 1993 until December 2003. 
By definition, the real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective rate adjusted for 
relative price differences between South Africa and her trading partners. That is: 
pd 
REAL = NOM*(pf)' or 
pf = RELATIVE = NOM 
pd REAL 
The relative prIce variable (RELATIVE) was thus created by dividing the nominal 
effective exchange rate by the real effective exchange rate lO . 
The nominal effective (or trade weighted) basis of depicting trends and calculating 
exchange rate movements is a superior measure to using a single currency comparison 
such as the dollar. Using a nominal effective rate ensures that relative cross-currency 
movements become less important. The real effective exchange rate measure also 
eliminates exchange rate movements solely owing to inflation rate differentials. For 
instance, should the rand show a weakening against the dollar, this may be, partly or even 
entirely, owing to a strengthening of the dollar against most other currencies (ABSA, 
2003). 
9 www.resbank.co.za 
10 The reason for defining relative prices as NOM/REAL as opposed to REALINOM stems from the fact 
that the variables NOM and REAL are both defined as the foreign currency price of a unit of local 











The nominal effective exchange rate is based on trade in and consumption of 
manufactured goods between South Africa and thirteen currencies (representing the most 
important trading partners) and excludes Zimbabwe due to the recent socioeconomic 
developments in that country. The real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective 
rate adjusted for relative price differences (using producer price indices). 
In Section 9, the real effective exchange rate of the Australian dollar was obtained from 
the Australian Reserve Bank website I I , and the various commodity price indices from the 
IMF World Database website12• The quarterly GDP figures were retrieved from the South 
African Reserve Bank database. 
Version 3.1 of the Eviews software package was used to organise and manipulate the 
time series data. All quantitative output presented in this study was generated using this 
package (Eviews, 1999). 
II \\'\vw.rba.gov.au 











7. Testing forJhe Purchasing Power Parity Relationship 
If RELATIVE is cointegrated with NOM, then PPP will hold since the two series will 
move closely together over time, thus implying that the difference between them (REAL) 
will be stable (constant). 
The test for cointegration between :.JOM and RELATIVE thus comprises two parts: 
a) Test each time series for the same order of integration. In the case of economic 
time series 1(1) is the most common representation. 
b) Test the residuals of the cointegrating regression for a reduction in the order of 
integration established in a) above. In the case of economic time series this will 
thus usually be a test of whether el - 1(0). This test comprises of a standard unit 
root test (ADF test), except that there is no time trend adjustment and no intercept 











7.1 Testing the Series for Unit Roots 
Three series were tested for stationarity (unit roots). These comprised: 
1. The natural log of the nominal effective exchange rate (LNOM) 
2. The natural log of the weighted relative price index, using producer pnces 
(LRELA TIVE) 
3. The natural log of the real effective exchange rate (LREAL) 
The tests were performed on periods: 
1. January 1993 May 1998, to examine the initial stages of South Africa's global 
integration and the changing nature of the socioeconomic landscape. 
") June 1998 December 2003, to examine the period during \vhich two major rand 
depreciations occurred. 
The testing strategy for unit roots proposed previously was employed. 












T able- ~: Yalue-s of the- t-statistir for the- ADF milt root tl?'st 
I Series I 93.01 05 




LREAL; C ** 
LRE.AL; T * 
* 
** 
signific ant at the 1 0 % level, 
signific ant at the 5 % level, 
Lags 98. 06- Lags 
I 
1 -2.0061 1 
1 -1. 8768 8 
0 -1.2962 3 
6 -1. 3 
1 -1.8043 0 
1 -1.1 0 
*** significant at the 1 % level, using the tables of MacKinnon (1990) 
The suffix C infers that an intercept term was included 
TI!e suffix T infers that a time trend and an intercept v.rere included. 
The lag formulation used was determined by systematically dropping values 
(from an initial set of 8 lags) until the last V,ras statistically significant, using a 5 % t-test. 
Table 2 above implies that all the series over both periods, with the exception of the real 
exchange rate 13 over the period 93.01-98.05, are non-stationary with at least one unit 
root. To confirm that the series are in fact -1(1) and possess only one unit root, the same 
test is applied to first differences of the series. Table 3 shows the results of the ADF test 
performed on the first differences. 
13 The tests were performed on both the REAL variable and its logarithmic (natural) transformation 
LREAL. The resulting statistics do not differ significantly however, and lead to the same conclusions. 











Table- 3: Value-s of the- t-statistir for th€' ADF unit loot t€'st on th€' fIrst cliffe-Ie-me-s 
Series 1193.01-98.051 Lags 1 9806-0312 1 Lags 1 
D(LNOM); C -53658 *** 
D(lNOM); T -5.3447 *** 
D (LRELATIVE); C -8.2912 *** 
D(LRELATIVE); T -8.3544 *** 
D(LREAL); C -5.6082 *** 
D(LREjI~); T -5.5742 *** 
** 
signific ant at the 10 % level, 
signific ant at the 5 % level, 
0 -5.9165 *** 0 
0 -6.1944 *** 0 
0 -5.8377 *** 0 
0 -59681 *** 0 
0 -6.7420 *** 0 
0 -7.0021 *** 0 
*** signific ant at the 1 % level, using the table s of MacKinnon (1990) 
The suffix C infers that an intercept tetm was included. 
The suffix T infers that a time trend and an intercept were included. 
The lag fotmulation used was detemillled by systematically dropping lagged values 
(from an initial set of 8 lags) until the last was statistic ally signific ant, using a 5 % t-te st. 
From Table 3 it follows that the first differences of both LNOM and LRELA TIVE are 
-1(0) for the two periods, indicating that the level series are -1(1). Since LNOM and 
LRELA TIVE are both integrated of the same order, i.e., -1(1), they are potential 
candidates as a pair of co integrated variables over the two periods. 
The real effective exchange rate LREAL is non-stationary -1(1) between 1998.06 and 











7.2 Testing the nominal effective exchange rate (LNOM) and the relative price index 
(LRELA TIVE) for cointegration 
Following from the fact that LNOM and LRELATIVE are both ~J(l), one may now 
proceed to test the two series for a cointegrating relationship. As discussed above, this 
requires that the residuals of a cointegrating regression are tested for stationarity so that it 
may be established that the residuals are ~J(O). The cointegrating regression may either 
be one where LNOM is regressed against the LRELA TIVE variable and a constant term, 
or \vhere LRELA TIVE is regressed against the LNOM variable and a constant term. The 
generated residual series of either regression should lead to the same conclusions. The 
following formulation was adopted in this paper: 
LNOlvil = a + j3LRELATIVE I+el 
Table 4 below shows the values of the ADF t-statistic for the residual of the cointegrating 
regression for the two periods. 
Tahl(- ... : ValuE'S of tllE' .4.DF t-statistir for tIte It>siduru of thE' roillt€'gI'ating r(-gI'(-ssion 
* 
** 
Series II 93.01-98.05 I 
LNOM& 
1 -3.4331-1 LRELATWE 
signific ant at the 1 0 % level, 
signific ant at the 5 % level, 
Lags 98. 06-03.12 Lags 
1 -1.2108 0 
*** significant at the 1 ~/o level, using the tables oD,1acKinnon (1990) 
The lag fOrnlulation used was deternlined by systematically droPPing lagged values 











On the basis of this analysis it can be concluded that: 
a) LNOM and LRELA TIVE are cointegrated over the sub-period 93.01-98.05 
b) LNOM and LRELA TIVE are not co integrated over the sub-period 98.06-03.12 
With reference to (a) above, the result obtained from the cointegration analysis is 
consistent with the result testing the stationarity of the real exchange rate (REAL) over 
the same sub-period. It was found that REAL was stationary over the same sub-period. It 
can therefore be concluded that PPP held between 1993.01 and 1998.05. 
With reference to (b) above, the result obtained from the cointegration analysis is 
consistent with the result testing the stationarity of the real exchange rate (REAL) over 
the same sub-period. It was found that REAL was not stationary over the same sub-
period. It can therefore be concluded that there was a breakdown of the PPP relationship 











8. PPP and FX Market Intervention 
Between 1993 and 1998, PPP held on the back of a stable rand post-1988. Although the 
initial stages of global integration impacted on the economy, there was only one 
substantial real shock over this period and the FX market quickly recovered from the 
investor scare of 1995. The nominal effective exchange rate and the inflation differential 
moved together statistically and this rendered the real exchange rate constant during the 
period. 
The results of the statistical tests show that there was a breakdown of the PPP 
relationship in South Africa between 1998 and 2003. This is an intuitive result since two 
major rand depreciations occurred within this period. The intervention in the foreign 
exchange market during the 1998 crisis did not have the desired effect and is a probable 
cause for the exchange rate's failure to adjust back to the long-run PPP trend over the 
next couple of years. The perceived riskiness of South Africa during these years, coupled 
with the detrimental factors pointed out by the Commission of Enquiry, culminated in the 
exchange rate crash in December 2001. Therefore, before the fundamentals could be re-
established and lead to the long-run adjustment of the exchange rate back to the PPP, the 
second crash occurred and led to a further deviation away from PPP. 
It can be argued that a significant difference between the handling of the 1998 and 200 I 
crises was the Reserve Bank's stance towards intervention. As was pointed out by the 
IMF, South Africa merely faced a contagion problem from Asia in 1998, and the 
economic fundamentals of all emerging markets deteriorated. This deterioration in 
fundamentals was however a short-run phenomenon, and had the Reserve Bank been less 
interventionist, the fundamentals would have reasserted themselves on the back of a 
functioning price mechanism. Instead, the Bank's intervention resulted in distortions that 
prevented price mechanism correction and a perception was created that South African 
fundamentals would continue being weak. Thus, the nominal effective exchange rate 
could not recover before the 2001 crash. Between 1998 and 2001, the nominal effective 











relative prices in parallel (see Figure 3). The depressed fundamentals had created an 
environment of 100v investor confidence and increased uncertainty. 
Conversely, the handling of the 200 I freefall by the Reserve Bank can be praised in 
retrospect. Although the non-interventionist stance contributed to the uncertainty 
surrounding the rand at the time, the long-run effect of non-intervention in the FX market 
was the creation of an environment where the price mechanism could reassert the 
economic fundamentals. 
A question of \vhether the Reserve Bank could have been more active in trying to limit 
the extent of the depreciation in 2001 remains. The impulse analysis conducted by 
Bhundia and Gottschalk shows that, in principle, monetary policy can be very effective 
with regard to the nominal exchange rate. However, leaning against depreciation would 
have required a substantial tightening of the monetary policy stance, and it is not clear 
that this would have been appropriate in an environment of slowing economic gro\:vth and 
muted inflationary pressures. Furthermore, their impulse response analysis shows that the 
effects of a nominal disturbance on the real exchange rate are fairly short lived, from 
which it follows that there is less need for strong interventions (of the 1998 kind) in the 
FX market, since the real effects ofthe depreciation should subside relatively quickly. 
The recovery of the nominal effective exchange rate towards the PPP trend is evident 
from Figure 3. One should therefore expect that in the absence of future shocks, once the 
"mean path" is reached, the real effective exchange rate will move according to economic 
fundamentals, while the nominal effective exchange rate will refiect the changes in both 
the real effective rate and relative prices. The apparent robustness of the economy at the 
moment should not be taken for granted however. A myriad of socio-economic problems 
remain, and the future stability of the rand is uncertain. According to Moody·s. one of the 
ways that the Reserve Bank could aid rand stability is to buy more foreign currency to 
boost its foreign reserves which covered only some two and a half months of imports at 











Figm"e 3: lVlean-reverting bebaviolU" of tbe 
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1. The rand depreciates due to the Asian contigation crisis . 
2. The Reserve Bank pushes perceived fundamentals down through intervention in the FX 
market and the Nominal Effective Exdw~e Rate is not able to recover back to its long-run 
trend. 
3. The NorninalEffective Exdw~ Rate moves parallel to the relatiVE: prices, i .e., there is no 
correction towal'ds the trend dictated by relative prices . 
4. The rand freefalls in N ovlDec 200 l. 
5. From rnid-2002 the rand begins its recovery towal'ds the long-run trend dictated by relative 
prices . The real exchal~ rate exhibits rnean-reverlil~ behaviour. 
The recent appreciation of the rand over the past two years is a good argument in favour 
of long-term adjustment to PPP. One of the key issues surrounding PPP is the length of 
time it takes the exchange rate to stabilise in light of shocks such as the 1998 and 200 1 
crashes. This question is beyond the scope of this paper (which is based on the Engle-












More rIgorous testing of the cointegrating relationship, including time-adjustment 
properties, can be based on the cointegration technique developed by Johansen (J 988, 
1991). The Johansen maximum likelihood approach has been shown to be a more 
efficient way of analysing the co integration structure relative to the traditional Engle-
Granger methodology (Maddala and Kim, 1998). Allowing modelling in a multivariate 
framework is one of the most crucial advantages of the Johansen maximum likelihood 
approach 14. 
14 Both Aron et al. (1997) and van Staden et al. (2002) use this approach to test the behaviour of South 











9. The Commodity Price Boom and the ~ecovery of thcRand 
The above thesis is based on the argument that the non-interventionist stance of the 
Reserve Bank during the 2001 crisis was instrumental in the rapid recovery of the rand. 
This may well be true, but although there is general agreement that the vast improvement 
in the rand is partly owing to the country's stronger external position (as reflected in the 
elimination of the commitments of the Reserve Bank to sell dollars on the forward 
exchange account), the recovery of the rand cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
commodity price boom that has been in effect since 2002. 
An accepted assumption for developing countries is that variability in real commodity 
prices has the potential to explain a large share of changes in real exchange rates, given 
that the majority of developing countries are highly dependent on commodities for the 
bu Ik of their export revenues (Cashin et aI., 2003). The rand is seen as one of the four lS 
main commodity-based currencies in the world, with the bulk of South African exports 
dependent on gold, platinum group metals, and coal. 
As a result of this dependency, the rand was very sensitive to commodity price cycles 
over the past decades (Ned cor, 2003). In particular, the boom in the prices of precious 
metals between 1976 and 1980 (the gold price boom) led to a soaring rand. But in 
contrast to previous commodity cycles, which stemmed from changes in prices of 
specific commodities (e.g. gold), the current upswing in international commodity prices 
applies across the board, encompassing base metals, minor metals, precious metals and 
even certain "soft" commodities (Absa, 2004). 
Figure 4 below shows the movement of the real effective exchange rate vis-a-vis the 
International Monetary Fund (lMF) World Commodity Metals Price Index. 











Figure 4: Real Effective Exchange Rate alul 
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Figure 4 illustrates the rand's sensitivity to the metals' price cycle between 1993 and 
2003. Periods of exaggerated movement in the real rand have tended to be associated 
with rising and falling commodity prices. In each downturn phase (indicated by the 











Since 1995, the IMF World Metal Index tracked the rand closely, with the exception of 
the 1999 to mid-2000 period. The 1999-2000 experience seems to indicate that it is not 
actual commodity prices that explain currency weakness, but more the expectations about 
those prices that prevail in investment circles16• The general downward trend in 
commodity prices since 1995 and expectations of future deflationary trends made 
investment in countries that enjoy a comparative advantage in resource and commodity 
sectors unattractive (similar analysis can be applied to the real Australian (and New 
Zealand) dollar movement) (Kantor, 2001). In other words, the dynamics of currency 
movements are indicated by commodity prices, not defined by them. A larger set of 
factors is at play, but nonetheless, the vulnerability of the rand to commodity cycles is 
clear. 
One explanation for the 200 I freefall includes the fact that the rand is a commodity-based 
currency, but this proposition does not hold on its own considering that other major 
commodity-based currencies did not experience a similar rapid decline. To exemplify 
this, Figure 5 shows how the rand has tracked the Australian dollar (a major commodity-
based currency) relatively well during the 1990s (with the exception of the 1996 investor 
scare), but how the relationship broke down in the final months of 200 l. In Figure 5, the 
two real effective exchange rates are modelled with respect to the IMF Non-Fuel Primary 
Commodities Price Index. 
16 The negative sentiment of equity investors about resource companies represented on the Sydney and 











FiglU"e 5: Real Effective Exchange Rates of the Ralul and the Australian Dollar 
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The closeness of the relationship between the rand and the Australian dollar can best be 
described by calculating the correlations between the two currencies (see Table 5). 
The association broke down during the 2001 freefall (indicated by the negative 
correlation), suggesting that the rand depreciation was influenced by factors other than 











Table 5: Correlations Between the Real EffE'ftiyE' EXfhange 
RatE's of the RamI and tilE' Anso:alian Dollal" 
Although the 200 I experience can be attributed to factors other than commodity prices, a 
case can be made that the commodity price boom that began in 2002 has been highly 
influential in the real appreciation of many commodity-based currencies. 
The latest upswing in the metals price index comes after a prolonged stagnation, and is 
indicative of a bullish market. The high correlation between the soaring metal prices and 
the rapid rand appreciation during 2002-2003 stands at approximately 70 percent (see 
Figure 4). 
Moreover, the 2002-2003 real appreciations of both the rand and the Australian dollar 
were closely matched, with the correlation between the two currencies standing at 96 
percent. This relationship started on the back of rising metal prices which began moving 
upwards in September 200 t. The exceptional performance of many commodities in 2003 
(more specifically: nickel, lead, copper, tin, zinc, platinum, and gold) came after already 
impressive gains in 2002. In 2003, four of the five top-performing currencies against the 
dollar were commodity-based currencies. This rally has occurred against the backdrop of 
a synchronised upswing in the world economy and fast-growing economies in Asia -











It has already been discussed that the exceptional recovery of the rand since 2002 
represents a retraction from the heavily undervalued situation that was brought about by 
the 1998 and 2001 rapid depreciations. The real appreciation has thus been seen as a 
movement back towards the long-run trend and probable reestablishment of long-run 
PPP. But despite the benefits associated with the reestablishment of PPP and international 
competitiveness, the current commodities boom is not benefiting the South African 
economy. 
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Note that the Real Effective Exchange Rate in Frgure 1 is defined such that 
an increase represents an appreciation and afalling value a depreciation 
Growth in GDP was calculatedyear-on~year using quarterly data and 











The gro\\1h in the gross domestic product fell to 1.5 percent in 2003 from 3.5 percent in 
2002. The economic windfall of rising commodity prices is not being experienced by 
South Africa because the US dollar price rises of many commodities have been 
counterbalanced by the appreciation in the rand. According to Absa (2004), the current 
advance in commodities is mostly reflected in a stronger rand and lower inflation, 
although the latter has facilitated a drop in domestic interest rates, \vhich is of benefit to 
the economy. 
Conversely, the strong rand is preventing the manufacturing sector from reaping the 
benefits of the global economic recovery. The appreciation of the rand has eroded export 
growth and depressed production in import-competing industries. As a result, overall 
manufacturing production contracted by 2.3 percent in 2003 compared with 2002 robust 












Figtue ;: "C\use of COIrunodiries" 
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While the commodity prices in dollar tenns have increased significantly during the past 
two years, the dollar prices of South African manufactured exports have, in general. 
remained unchanged or risen only marginally. The rand prices of manufactured export 
products have therefore fallen much more sharply than those of commodity exports. The 
rand has become more of a commodities-based currency, but the mining sector in South 
Africa has received no meaningful benefits from the boom because of the huge rand 
appreciation. This has exerted a depressing influence on mining output. Furthermore, the 
movement towards commodities poses a significant threat to manufactured exports. The 
country's reliance on commodity exports could rise, and in turn render the rand more 
volatile (Absa, 2004). 
Such instability would bring into focus the suitability of Reserve Bank's policy of non-
intervention. At present the Bank is "creaming off' dollars in the FX market to strengthen 
its foreign exchange reserves. More importantly, it is doing so to eventually eliminate the 
NOFP. 
On the negative side, the rise in the foreign reserves could precipitate a considerable 
increase in banking liquidity (as the Bank sells rands to buy dollars), which in turn could 
pose inflationary dangers. On the positive side, the elimination of the NOFP is bringing 
about some upward credit assessment by the foreign community, which could lead to 












The early and mid-l 990s were characterised by the opening up of the South African 
economy to international forces, and gradual liberalisation of the FX market. The PPP 
held for the period 1993-1998, indicating that inflation differentials between South Africa 
and her major trading partners were offset by exchange rate changes. 
The results of the statistical tests show that there was a breakdown of the PPP 
relationship in South Africa between 1998 and 2003. During this period, the rand was a 
weak currency and was negatively affected by a combination of adverse economic 
circumstances, which resulted in two major rand depreciations. The Reserve Bank 
intervention during the 1998 crisis failed to protect the rand, and contributed to the 
further \veakening of economic fundamentals, so that the exchange rate was unable to 
recover before the 2001 freefal!. The failure of PPP during this latter period is therefore 
intuitive. 
The recent recovery of the rand, and real exchange rate retraction towards the long-run 
PPP trend, can partly be attributed to the non-interventionist stance of the Bank during 
the 2001 crisis. Moreover, it is clear that the commodity price boom that has been in 
effect since 2002 has played a major role in the rapid rand appreciation. Whereas the 
1990s exchange rate experience seemed to be dominated by issues surrounding the 
reintegration of the South African economy into the international community, and the 
importance of international sentiment towards economic fundamentals of emerging 











Political risk factors and social problems still remain, but due to the pronounced 
international commodity boom, the rand is now in unfamiliar territory. The analysis 
points to long-tenn adjustment towards PPP, but the volatility of the rand in the face of 
increased reliance on commodity exports presents a new threat. If one accepts the 
proposal that the currency is now almost fairly valued by the PPP measure, a case can be 
made for policy moves to restrain any renewed rand appreciation. One such policy could 
involve further liberalisation of exchange controls. 
Since the beginning of 2004, the rand has been more stable against the dollar and the 
dollar prices of commodities have generally still been rising strongly. A whole new 
positive environment could eventually emerge if this boom stretches over several more 
years and if the rand maintains its PPP trend. Conversely, the threat to manufactured 
exports from an appreciating rand could render the exchange rate more volatile and 
increase uncertainty. 
One fact that has emerged from this analysis is that an emerging commodity market, such 
as South Africa, that has maintained a flexible, and in recent years, a more free and 
transparent exchange rate regime, will occasionally experience powerful effects (adverse 
or positive) stemming from international events. It is a question of how the policy makers 
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Appendix: Monte-Carlo Simulation Study 


























Set Sample equal to 
the first observation 
Set Sample equal to the 
following 999 observations 
A sample of 1000 observations was created and two uncorrelated non-stationary random 
walks "y" and "x" were generated. "y" was then regressed on "x" using the model: 
y, = Po + PIXI + G,. In the context of the paper, one could imagine that "y" represents the 
nominal effective exchange rate, and "x" represents relative prices. 
The process of generating "y" and "x", and regressing one on the other, was looped ] 00 












For the t-statistic, the coefficient and the standard error of ~J were recorded into separate 
vectors, and the t-stat and p-value estimated for the null Ho: ~I=O. 
An "if' command was introduced to separate the p-values into those greater than 5% and 
those less than 5%, and depending on the value generated in a pass through the loop, the 
value was recorded into the appropriate scalar named "accepttstat" or "rejecttstat". The 
program was looped 1 00 times, so that in total, the two scalars would together contain 
100 values. 
The Fisher-z value was computed from the correlation (x, y), and a z-statistic obtained by 
standardizing the Fisher-z to a normal distribution. The z-statistic was then tested for the 
null that the correlation coefficient is not significantly different from 0, i.e., Ho: p=O, and 
an "if' command introduced to separate the z-statistic into those greater or less than 1.96, 
and depending on the value generated in a pass through the loop, the value was recorded 
into the appropriate scalar named "acceptcorr" or "rejectcorr". The program was looped 
1 00 times, so that in total, the two scalars would together contain 1 00 values. 
The above simulation was run I 00 times, resulting in an estimated mean value for ~l of -
0.050, and an associated standard error of 0.029 (given a sample size of T=1000), thus 
rejecting the null that E[PI]=O. Based on 100 replications, the probability of rejecting the 
null of no association at the conventional significance level of 0.05 was found to be 0.95 
(i.e., in 95 percent of the regressions, values of Itl> 1.96 were obtained). This was due to 
the fact that the mean t-statistic obtained from the experiment was -0.05 instead of zero, 
with an associated standard deviation of 0.685. The non-standard distribution of the t-
statistic accounts for the very high rejection rate of the null. 
A similar conclusion is obtained by evaluating the significance of the Fisher-z statistic. 
Based on 100 replications, and a sample size of 1000, the probability of rejecting the null 
of a correlation coefficient equal to zero at the conventional significance level of 0.05 











By varying the size of the sample T. it was found that the probability of rejecting the 
(true) null Ho: PI=O will increase with sample size. The rejection rate for the t statistic 
was 65% for T=50, 76% for T=100, 91 % for T=500, and 95% for 1000. 
By varying the size of the sample T, the probability of rejecting the (true) null Ho: p=o 
did not increase with sample size. The rejection rate for the normalized z-statistic was 
92% for T=50, 95% for T= 1 00, 96% for T=500, and 95% for T= 1 000. 
If Yt and Xt are modelled with a drift term (up to now it was assumed that the two series 
were pure random walks), for each sample size T, the rejection rate is slightly higher than 
if the two series are modelled without drift. 
Furthermore, it was found that the R2 of a regression of one random walk on another 
becomes a random variable in a regression of unrelated nonstationary variables, and the 
likelihood of finding a sizable R2 in that context is rather large. 
In summary, there is often a problem of falsely concluding that a relationship exists 
between two unrelated non-stationary series. This is especially important when analysing 
relationships such as the PPP. This problem generally increases with the sample size and 
it cannot be solved by attempting to detrend the underlying series as would be possible 
with trend-stationary data. This leads to the question of when it is possible to infer a 
causal long-run relationship(s) between non-stationary time series, based on estimating a 
standard regression such as: y/ Po + PIX] +C/ ? 
Demonstrably, OLS does not yield consistent estimates of the true slope parameter in this 
instance: the case of a spurious regression, as defined by Granger and Nev,,'bold (1974). 
The problem of spurious regressions appears with 1(1) variables, so the determination of 
unit root processes (generally using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller ADF test) is essential. 











whether cointegration exists, and whether there is theoretical economic ground for such 
co integration, is important as wcll 17• 
EVIEWS PROGRAM CODE 





vector{ 100) corr JY 
vector{ 100) fisher_z 
vector(100) z_star 
vector{ 100) beta 
vector{ 100) serr 
vector( 100) t_ stat 
vector(100) p_value 
for !O = 1 to 100 
smpl1 1 
genr Y = 0 
genr x = 0 
smpl21000 
genr Y = y(-1) + nrnd or alternatively for drift component genr y 0.1 *rnd 
+ y(-1) + nrnd 
genr x = x(-1) + nrnd or alternatively for drift component genr x = 0.1 *rnd 
+ x(-1) + nrnd 
equation q3a.ls y c x 
corr_xy(!O) = @cor(x,y) 




t_stat(!O) (beta( !O)-O)/serr(!O) 
p_value('O) @tdist(t_stat(!0),48) 
if z_star(!O)<1.96 then 
acceptcorr acceptcorr + 1 
else 
rejectcorr = rejectcorr + 1 
endif 
if p_value(!O) > 0.05 then 
accepttstat = accepttstat +1 
else 
rejecttstat rejecttstat +1 
endif 
next 
I would like to thank Professor Graham Barr for his help in clearly explaining the unit root processes in 
Eviews programming. The technical detail presented in this dissertation would not have been possible 
without the knowledge, reading material and notes, imparted by Professor Barr during the coursework at 
the 2003 Financial Time Series Module for Masters Studies at the University of Cape Town. 
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